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This paper explores the interplay between artistic and scientific representative practices between 1880
and 1914. I argue that science and technology challenged the concept of resemblance in art and that the
rhythm of scientific and technological discoveries at the turn of the 20th century paralleled a shift from
a notion of similarity to one of homomorphism in the conceptualization of artistic representation.
Homomorphism denotes representations which dispense with a point-to-point correspondence between
depicted objects and perceptual data. I developed the concept from a study of Charles S. Peirce’s
pragmatic account of representation, and in particular his theory of iconicity. Drawing on two case-
studies – the photographer Alfred Stieglitz and the painter Pablo Picasso – I claim that, between 1880
and 1914, representative practices in art were strongly informed by scientific experimental practices
and that the shift from figurative to conceptual representations in art was triggered by a more
significant shift involving representation as a general philosophical notion. Ultimately, by combining
the relative merits of historical and philosophical accounts of representations, I argue for the
advantages and desirability of a philosophically informed history of representative practices.
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“Representative practices” between 1880 and 1914: An overview
The years between 1880 and 1914 were a time of intense experimentation in
art and science, with no clear-cut separation between the “two cultures”.2
Representative conventions became variable in the visual arts, and artists deliberately
departed from a concept of depiction considered as physical resemblance or
photographic similarity. Pictorial considerations on form and space progressed toward
a conceptualization of figures and objects that transcended perceptual data, and the
rendering of pictorial objects turned into an experiment involving complex
visualization processes. This paper explores the shift from figurative to conceptual
representations in the visual arts in light of the developments that characterized
scientific representative practices at the turn of the 20th century.
Recent interdisciplinary studies on the relations between art and science offer
compelling evidence of an open dialogue between these two fields.3 Building on the
insights emerging from the existing literature on the relations between art and science,
I will contribute to the field with an innovative, pragmatically grounded evaluation of
the shift that characterized artistic representative practices between 1880 and 1914.
By referring to “representative practices”, I intend to emphasize the pragmatic
aspects of what philosophers, in a somehow restricting fashion, call
1 This paper summarizes the main lines of inquiry of a research project which is still at its earliest
stages, and which I intend to pursue in the coming years. I am grateful to Hasok Chang, Grant Fisher
and Arthur I. Miller for their encouragement and their useful comments on earlier versions of this
paper. I am especially grateful to Catherine M. Jackson for her help and guidance with references on
Hofmann’s and Liebig’s laboratory.
2 Knight (1986); Kern (1987); Miller (2001).
3 Henderson (1983); Miller (2000) and Miller (2001); Parkinson (2008).
2“representations”.4 Hence, rather than focusing on a normative quest for the necessary
and sufficient conditions for representation (a quest that seems to occupy a central
place in the philosopher’s agenda nowadays), I propose a pragmatic evaluation of the
means and strategies through which artists and scientists devise fruitful and
perspicuous representations of the world. In doing so, I address two fundamental gaps
in the literature on representation. Historians of art and historians of science fail to
capture the philosophical import of the contemporary tendency toward conceptual
representations. A historical evaluation of the representational shift in the years 1880-
1914 needs to be substantiated by an epistemological account of how such a change
affected styles of knowing and experimental practices in art and science.
Philosophers, on the other hand, often neglect the history of representative practice,
and the ways in which it was made by artists in their studios and scientists in their
laboratories. Philosophical accounts of representation lack a fundamental connection
with the history of artistic and scientific experimentation. This paper will inquire into
the experimental aspects of representative practices considered as ways of exploring
natural phenomena and intervening upon them.
A well established philosophical tradition dating back to the 1960s frames the
problem of visual representations in terms of a critique of a notion of resemblance
between representing facts and represented objects.5 The core tenet of this position is
well summarized in Nelson Goodman’s 1962 classic work Languages of Art:
“The plain fact is that a picture, to represent an object, must be a symbol for
it, stand for it, refer to it; and that no degree of resemblance is sufficient to
establish the requisite relationship of reference. Nor is resemblance necessary
for reference; almost anything may stand for almost anything else. A picture
that represents –like a passage that describes– refers to and, more
particularly, denotes it. Denotation is the core of representation and is
independent of resemblance”. 6
I claim that artists reached the conclusion that resemblance is neither
necessary nor sufficient for representation much earlier than philosophers. And they
did so through practice, a practice which was dramatically affected by the scientific
and technological trends that characterized the turn of the 20th century. Contrary to
Goodman, however, artists did not resort to a concept of denotation to explain visual
representation. The story of their quest for a satisfactory representative relation can
provide a useful, practice-based, and historically grounded corrective to Goodman’s
(and Goodman-inspired) arguments against resemblance.
An overview of the fin-de-siècle scientific and technological trends will help
the reader contextualize my discussion of the changes that dramatically affected
representative practices in the visual arts.7 The climate of experimentalism that
4 See for example Bartels (2006); French (2003); Frigg (2006); Suárez (2002) and Suárez (2003). All
these studies address scientific representations in comparison with artistic representations. Yet, as I will
argue in the course of this paper, all seem to lack a fundamental connection with the experimental
character of representational practices and their historical development.
5 See for example Bierman (1963); Goodman (1962) and more recently Frigg (2006) and Suárez
(2003).
6 Goodman (1962), p. 5.
7 What follows has by no means the pretence of providing an exhaustive historical treatment of the
revolutionary changes that characterized the turn of the 19th century and their impact on the visual arts.
For more extensive discussions see Alexis (1994); Behrens (2002); Didi-Huberman (1986); Everdell
(1999); Galison, Holton and Schweber (2008), Henderson (1983); Kern (1987); Knight (1986); Jones
3characterized 19th century science laid the foundations for the great changes that
swept Europe in the years 1880-1914 and paved the way to the reception of such
changes by the wide public. Throughout the 19th century, science had progressively
shifted toward a practical and social dimension. Scientific societies, demonstration-
lectures open to the public and the diffusion of popular science magazines are just
some of the most glaring examples of how scientific knowledge gradually turned into
an inclusive and public activity. Yet, the years between 1880 and 1914 were also a
phase of transition and tension between opposite tendencies. The intellectual
certainties and the trust in science as a truth-conducive pursuit that characterized the
early 19th century became progressively eroded at the turn of the century. Discoveries
such as X-rays (1895), radioactivity (1896) and the electron (1897) challenged the
positivists’ emphasis on observable data and suggested the possibility of unobservable
phenomena behind them. The popularization of non-Euclidean and n-dimensional
geometries brought about novel conceptions of space that exceeded sense perception.
Automobiles, airplanes and the development of transports transformed the perception
of geographical boundaries, while wireless telegraphy and telephones granted rapid
transmission of information in real time, independently of physical distances. The
invention of war camouflage defied the rules of perception and reshaped notions of
form and space in novel and disorienting ways. Photography challenged scientific and
artistic representative practices alike, while the scientific and technological roots of
cinema offered the possibility of capturing the temporal sequence of action in space.
A climate of change and uncertainty permeated intellectual life at the turn of
the 20th century. In this context, a concept of representation as a faithful
correspondence to perceptual data was no longer possible. Both in art and in science
fundamental concepts such as observation, space, time and the very nature of reality
were questioned. This compelled artists and scientists to shift dramatically from
perceptually accurate representations to conceptual ones.
The story of this transition is a fascinating and complex one, which is better
tackled through case-studies. In the following sections I will look into the
representative practices of the photographer Alfred Stieglitz and the painter Pablo
Picasso, whose production triggered a genuine revolution in the way artists conceived
representations at the beginning of the 20th century. Both of them were actively
engaged in scientific debates that shaped their art. Both of them turned explicitly to
science in their revolutionary effort to reformulate the relation at the basis of visual
representations. Their works can tell us a great deal about the relations between
representation and practice – indeed, their works show that representing is a form of
experimenting.
Alfred Stieglitz: chemistry, experimentalism and the shaping of
photography as art
Alfred Stieglitz (1864-1946) is widely recognized by art historians as the
pioneer of modernist photography and the key impresario of American avant-garde. A
visionary intellectual, patron and promoter of European modernist movements in
America, Stiegliz played a key role in defining the theoretical and practical
foundations of photography as a form of art. What art historians often tend to neglect,
and Galison (1998); Miller (2001); Parkinson (1996); Parkinson (2008); Peat (2002); Robbin (2006);
Wilder (2009).
4however, is that the foundations of his practice as a photographer lay in the climate of
experimentalism that characterized German science in the 1880s.8
Stieglitz was born in Hoboken (New Jersey) in 1864, from a relatively wealthy
German family. His father, Edward Stieglitz, was a pragmatically oriented man who
worked as a craftsman of mathematical instruments. His mother, Hedwig Stieglitz,
was a cultivated woman whose interests laid primarily in literature, art and music. In
1881, the Stieglitz moved to Berlin, where Alfred enrolled at the Karlshrue
Realgymnasium to enter the Charlottenburg Polytechnic. The following academic
year, after his father’s suggestion, he began a degree in mechanical engineering.
Stieglitz’s biographers have usually regarded his student years as an initial
obstacle to the development of his artistic career.9 Yet, the impact that his engineering
and chemical training had on his subsequent artistic production tells a different story.
In the 1880s, a number of illustrious scientists were based at the University of Berlin
and Stieglitz did not miss the opportunity to enrich his curriculum at the Polytechnic
by auditing their lectures and laboratory practices. Among them were the physicists
Hermann Von Helmholtz and Heinrich Hertz, who worked with Helmholtz in Berlin
between 1881 and 1883; the physiologist Emil DuBois- Reymond and the
anthropologist and pathologist Rudolf Virchow. But the two figures who influenced
Stieglitz in the most dramatic way were the chemists August von Hofmann and
Hermann Wilhelm Vogel.
Hofmann is especially known for his work on coal tar and his contribution to
the development of aniline dyes, which laid the foundations of the German dye
industry. A student of Justus Liebig at the University of Giessen, he had been, under
his teacher’s guidance, a pioneer in the transition from analytical to synthetic organic
chemistry. In the 1880s, Hofmann was at the peak of his academic career. By the time
Stieglitz attended his lectures, he had inherited and improved Liebig’s successful
methodology based on a harmonious combination of teaching and research.10
Hofmann’s laboratory was a proper research community, in which knowledge was
conveyed through practice. Most of the daily learning under his guidance happened
by observing and doing, whereas lectures fulfilled the purpose of providing a
theoretical background for students who lacked prior chemical training.11 Indeed, one
of the most important methodological points that Hofmann adopted from Liebig was a
systematic philosophy of chemical practice, whereby “experimental skill as well as
theoretical convictions guided the analyst along a highly uncertain path from
experiment to formula”.12
The concept that practice, far from being subordinate to theory, was
constitutive of it13 became especially important to Stieglitz. In 1882, he switched from
engineering to chemistry, and at the same time he began experimenting with
photography. The scientific aesthetics underpinning his practice as a photographer
revolved around the idea that photography and science shared the same experimental
basis and that in both cases theoretical considerations emerged as generalizations
from practical experience. When, in 1905, he established the Little Galleries at 291-
8 The only exception so far is Kiefer (1990), whose excellent study is an invaluable source on Stieglitz
and science.
9 Kiefer (1990), p. 59; Lowe (2002), p. 74.
10 On Liebig’s laboratory see Fruton (1988); Holmes (1989); Morrell (1972); and Jackson (2008); on
the relations between Liebig and Hofmann’s laboratory practices see Jackson (2006) and Jackson
(2009).
11 Bentley (1970), p. 168.
12 Jackson (2009), p. 16.
13 Ibid., p. 13.
5293 Fifth Avenue, New York, he characterised them as his “experimental stations”,14
and modeled them on a Liebig-inspired laboratory. And just as a scientific research
community, Stieglitz and his laboratory group disseminated their findings through the
journal Camera Work, which became one of the most important instruments for the
promotion of experimental avant-garde in the 20th century.15 As his friend Herbert
Seligmann recalled several years later, “Stieglitz said of himself that at heart he was a
scientist”.16
Along with Hofmann, another influential teacher for Stieglitz was the chemist
Hermann Wilhelm Vogel, whose classes and laboratory practice he attended at the
Charlottenburg Polytechnic. Vogel’s work in photochemistry was well known in the
1880s. His discovery of “optical” or “color” sensitizers resulted in the introduction of
orthochromatic film, which was sensitive to all colors, except the notoriously
problematic red end of the spectrum.17 Under Vogel’s guidance, Stieglitz developed
indispensable technical skills and knowledge of the chemical process behind
photography and its technological applications. At the same time, his laboratory
practice focused on “training the eye”18 by performing and documenting repeated
photographic experiments.
Stieglitz’s enthusiasm in Vogel’s teaching was not only limited to his
discoveries in photochemistry. In an article for the magazine The Amateur
Photographer dated 1887, for which he was asked to write a report on amateur
photography in Germany, he decided to focus on his teacher’s laboratory. After a
description of Vogel’s use of the latest technological innovations for the purposes of
laboratory practice and a discussion of the theoretical foundations of his approach to
photochemistry, Stieglitz suggested that Vogel’s laboratory, just like Hofmann’s, was
modeled on Justus Liebig’s.19
Throughout his chemical training with Hofmann and Vogel, Stieglitz
developed indispensable critical tools to approach the emerging and still greatly
controversial field of photography. Since 1839, when the first daguerreotype was
publicly announced at the Paris Académie des Sciences, the status of photography had
been the subject of animated discussions. Scientists initially regarded it as the ultimate
tool to obtain objectivity in observation and measurement. Its mechanical,
reproducible and reliable nature was a reason to believe that it would function as “an
artificial retina…at the disposal of the physicists”,20 as Jean Baptiste Biot
enthusiastically announced to the assembled members of the Académie des Sciences.
By the end of the 19th century, photography was widely used by scientists as an
instrument of observation of phenomena which were considered otherwise
unobservable and it was widely employed as a form of measurement and as a means
of obtaining experimental evidence.21
Contrary to scientists, artists looked at photography as a creative medium
which was complementary and comparable to painting. Pictorialism, a movement that
became dominant in the 1890s, explicitly aimed to differentiate artistic photography
from scientific photography by treating the former as painting. Pictorialist
14 Kiefer (1990), pp. 326 and 454.
15 See Eversole (2005), pp. 5-18.
16 Seligmann (1966), quoted in Kiefer (1990), p. 377.
17 Kiefer (1990), p. 100, Wilder (2009), p. 69.
18 Vogel (1875), p. 299.
19 Stieglitz (1887), p. 96. See also Kiefer (1990), p. 104.
20 Arago (1839), quoted in Wilder (2009), p. 9.
21 See Didi-Hubermann (1986), pp. 71-76 and Wilder (1990), pp. 52-78.
6photographers accomplished this by selecting carefully the content and the
perspective from which photographs were taken and by intervening on the pictures by
retouching them. This practice aimed to bring the artist’s subjectivity right at the core
of technical photography.
Stieglitz’s scientific background, coupled with his involvement in modernist
movements, progressively made him feel dissatisfied with the naïve subjectivity
professed by the proponents of Pictorialism. Contrary to their claims, he conceived
experimental photography as a practice in which artistic subjectivity could be used for
the purpose of achieving objectivity through experimental inquiry. His 1907
photograph, The Steerage, condensed the artistic outcomes of his evolving views on
scientific experimentalism and marked the culminating point of his synthesis of art
and science.
The story of The Steerage is well known to art historians. Stieglitz was
traveling to Europe on board the prestigious liner SS Wilhelm II. Despite having a
place on the first class deck, he wondered with his camera in the vicinities of the
steerage, with the purpose of taking pictures. In his memoirs, he recalls the taking of
The Steerage as follows:
“A round straw hat, the funnel leaning left, the stairway leaning right, the white draw-
bridge with its railings made of circular chains—white suspenders crossing on the
back of a man in the steerage below, round shapes of iron machinery, a mast cutting
into the ski, making a triangular shape. I stood spellbound for a while, looking and
looking and looking. Could I photograph what I felt, looking, looking and still
looking? I saw shapes related to each other. I saw a picture of shapes and underlying
that the feeling I had about life”.22
By concentrating on the inner relations between forms, Stieglitz obtained a
photographic representation that verged on the conceptual. Far from exhibiting a
faithful, point-to point correspondence to a concrete event, The Steerage condenses
Stieglitz’s awareness that photography entails a process of abstraction and
generalization from visual experience. His artistic quest for structure and form beyond
immediate sense perception, which found its ultimate realization in The Steerage, was
modeled on his chemical laboratory practice.
Under Hofmann’s guidance, Stieglitz had come to appreciate that chemical
knowledge proceeds from experiment to general formulae. As results of practical
experimentation, chemical formulae are condensed abstractions of the objects they
stand for. At the same time, however, they are richer and more informative than their
objects, for they capture structural properties of the experimental processes from
which they arise. Moreover, by practicing chemistry in Hofmann’s laboratory,
Stieglitz had become familiar with the view that practice and process are constitutive
components of theoretical knowledge. In approaching photography as a scientific
problem to be solved experimentally, he devised a novel form of representation which
dispensed with exact resemblance, just like chemical formulae do.
With The Steerage, Stieglitz found a satisfactory balance between his
photographic practice and his experimental philosophy. All his subsequent production
is informed by his experimental quest for conceptual representations. By challenging
naïve photographic realism and the simplistic subjectivity of Pictorialism, he devised
an entirely novel relation at the basis of photographic representations. Stieglitz was
well aware that photography, as every act of observation, is theory-dependent. And
22 Stieglitz (1942-43), p. 128.
7the theory that informs photography is in turn shaped by the needs and goals of the
photographer, along with his tools and laboratory practice. Stieglitz’s scientific
training provided him with a renewed awareness of this aspect of photography and of
the experimental process that guides the photographer from “looking, looking and still
looking”23 to the final image.
By concentrating on the inner relations between forms, Stieglitz brought
photography at the centre of avant-garde experimentation, in a fashion that anticipated
the multiple perspectives of Cubist paintings. Indeed, when shown The Steerage by
art critic and caricaturist Marius de Zayas in 1910, Pablo Picasso is said to have
promptly answered: “This photographer is working in the same spirit as I am”.24
Cubism, science and representation beyond resemblance
In 1907 – the same year in which Stieglitz photographed The Steerage – Pablo
Picasso (1881-1973) completed Les Demoiselles d’Avignon, the painting which would
pave the way to Cubism. Recent interdisciplinary studies25 reveal a fresh interest in
the relations between Cubism and the scientific and technological discoveries that
marked the beginning of the 20th century. Unlike Stieglitz, Picasso never received any
formal scientific training. His initiation into the realm of science was unorthodox and
unconventional, and took place in the lively setting of Parisian intellectual life.
Paris was at the centre of the cultural and scientific changes that shook Europe
at the beginning of the 20th century. A manifold of sources that popularized the latest
scientific developments in an accessible language were available to the public. French
newspapers and magazines such as L’Intransigeant, Le Temps, Le Matin and Paris-
Journal and the Mercure de France recurrently presented quasi-scientific articles
publicizing the latest discoveries.26 The popularization of non-Euclidean and n-
dimensional geometries especially interested Picasso, as it implied a radically novel
conception of space that turned out to be crucial for the development of Cubism.
Within the atmosphere of change and expectations that characterized Parisian
life at the turn of the century, Picasso and his circle, comprising the poet Guillaume
Apollinaire and the writers Max Jacob and André Salmon, embarked on a creative
enterprise that compelled them to explore diverse realms of knowledge and confront
the traditional separation between art, science, philosophy, technology and literature.
A central character in the story of the relation between Cubism and science is
Maurice Princet. Princet was an insurance actuary with an interest in advanced
mathematics; his mistress Alice Géry introduced him to Picasso in 1905. From that
date onwards, Princet’s presence among artists in Montmartre is recorded by a
number of primary sources.27 Because of his contribution in shaping the theoretical
bases of Cubism, Princet earned the prestigious title of “le mathématicien du
Cubisme”.28
Among the primary sources attesting to the presence of Princet within
Picasso’s circle there was the Cubist painter Jean Metzinger, who wrote in 1912:
23 Stieglitz (1942-43), p. 128.
24 Kiefer (1990), p. 394.
25 Henderson (1983); Henderson (2004); Miller (2000); Miller (2001); Robbin (2006).
26 Henderson (1983), pp. 10-41; Miller (2001), pp. 26-28.
27 Salmon (1912) in Miller (2001), p.102; Gleizes and Metzinger, (1912), p. 43; Salmon (1955), p. 187;
Vauxcelles, (1918) in Henderson, (1983), pp. 71-72.
28 See Salmon (1955), p. 187.
8“Often Maurice Princet joined us…He conceived mathematics like an artist
and evoked continua of n dimensions like an aesthetician. He liked to interest
painters in the new views of space opened by Victor Schlegel and succeeded
in doing this”.29
A first-hand account of Princet’s role among Picasso’s circle is found also in
Salmon’s writings. In a column of the Paris Journal, Salmon reports the forthcoming
publication of “a curious book on aesthetics”30 by Princet. He describes Princet as a
mathematician who was inspired by the latest developments in contemporary art and
who praised the disdain for ancient perspective expressed by modern painting.31
Princet’s book was never published, but his name recurs in Salmon’s writings in
concomitance with his description of the birth of Cubism.32
Another primary source testifying the presence of Princet within Picasso’s circle
was the French art critic Louis Vauxcelles, who related Princet to Henri Poincaré and
his popularization of non-Euclidean geometries in an entertaining account of the birth
of Cubism:
“It is willingly believed in the studios of Montparnasse…that the inventor of
Cubism was M. Max Jacob. We believed it ourselves. But, it is necessary to
restore to Caesar his honor and Caesar, in this case, is named M. Princet. This
is the first time, we think, that this name is printed in the annals of Cubism.
M. Princet is an “insurance man” and very strong in mathematics. M. Princet
calculates like Inaudi. M. Poincet [sic] read Henri Poincaré in the text. M.
Princet has studied at length non-Euclidean geometries and the theorems of
Riemann, of which Gleizes and Metzinger speak rather carelessly. Now, then,
M. Princet one day met M. Max Jacob and confided to him one or two of his
discoveries relating to the fourth dimension. M. Jacob informed the ingenious
M. Picasso of it, explained his intentions to M. Apollinaire, who hastened to
write them up in formularies and codify them. The thing spread and
propagated…Cubism, child of M. Princet, was born”.33
Through Princet, Poincaré’s discussion of non-Euclidean geometries gradually
entered the Cubists’ imagination. It is highly improbable that Picasso read any of the
scientific or philosophical papers on non-Euclidean geometries and fourth dimension
circulating in Paris at the beginning of the 20th century. It was mainly through Princet
that he elaborated a new concept of space as an expressive possibility that demanded
pictorial exploration.34
Another source Princet might have referred to was Esprit Pascal Jouffret’s vividly
illustrated Traité Élémentaire de Géométrie à Quatre Dimensions (Elementary
Treatise on Four-dimensional Geometry).35 In his treatise, Jouffret summarized the
current literature on fourth dimension; he repeatedly cited Poincaré’s work and
provided his readers with detailed illustrations of projections of four-dimensional
polyhedra onto two-dimensional surfaces. A characteristic of Jouffret’s projections
29 Metzinger (1912), p. 43.
30 Salmon (1910), quoted in Miller (2002), p. 102.
31 See Miller (2002), p. 102.
32 See Salmon (1919), p. 485.
33 Vauxcelles (1918), quoted in Henderson (1983), pp. 71-72.
34 See Henderson (1983), pp. 67ff and Miller (2001), pp. 100-104 and pp. 114-115.
35 See Henderson (1983), pp. 57ff; Miller (2001), pp. 108-110 and Robbins (2006), pp. 28-40.
9was their extreme faceting, an effect which could be obtained through a new method
known by mathematicians as “perspective cavalière”.36
Poincaré’s discussions on non-Euclidean geometries and Jouffret’s projections
of four dimensional solids offered a basis for the geometric developments that
characterize Picasso’s cubist canvases. He elaborated these elements at a crucial point
of his artistic career, in which Princet’s lectures on geometry provided him with a
radically novel way to reformulate visual representations. In 1907, while Picasso was
completing Les Demoiselles d’Avignon, geometry would lead him to the discovery of
Cubism.
Les Demoiselles d’Avignon represents five oddly shaped female figures gazing
at a point in space outside the canvas. Progressing from left to right, a dominant
feature of the painting is the gradual geometrization of the female bodies that reaches
its highest point in the squatting demoiselle at the bottom-right corner of the painting.
Les Demoiselles d’Avignon deliberately clashed with previous definitions of visual
representation in art. The preparatory sketches contained in Picasso’s cahiers reveal
that the completion of the canvas required him to break out of the boundaries of art
and visually narrate the story of his “research on the frontiers of knowledge”.37
Notions from non-Euclidean geometry and the fourth dimension were at the core
of Picasso’s revolutionary cubist aesthetics, which consisted of the reduction of forms
to their conceptual geometric properties. The new geometries furthered his research of
novel ways to explore the nature of space. This culminated in a reformulation of the
very concept of spatial relations on the picture plane that verged on the possibility of
conceiving geometrical relations that cannot actually be perceived.
Historical studies of Picasso’s 1907 conceptual turn38 tend to underestimate its
philosophical import for a general theory of representation. By challenging the
relation of resemblance that had governed figurative painting since the Renaissance,
Cubism offered artists a means to represent structural properties of objects in space.
Figurative art exhibited a natural resemblance with the entities it referred to. This
implied an immediate recognition of depicted objects and a clearly identifiable
narrative structure, with a consequently lesser amount of conceptual effort for the
viewer. Les Demoiselles d’Avignon radically clashed with this representative
tradition. Picasso mapped figures and objects, their constitutive properties and the
relations among them into a different spatial frame. Like non-Euclidean geometric
visualization, Les Demoiselles requires a considerable conceptual effort, which
consists of grasping a structural relation between representations and the states of
affairs they stand for. This feature of Cubism shares a number of important features
with Stieglitz’s original approach to photography, and that both exemplify the
revolutionary shift that led artists from a notion of similarity to one of homomorphism
in their conceptualization of representative relations.
Iconicity as Homomorphism: Representative Practices and Theories of
Representation
Between 1880 and 1914, artists achieved through practice and through careful
observation of scientific and technological developments what philosophers of
science began exploring and questioning only recently: a critique of resemblance at
the basis of representation. My discussion of Stieglitz’s and Picasso’s quest for a
36 See Jouffret (1903), p. 154.
37 Miller (2001), p. 106.
38 Steinberg (1972); Bois (1987); Rubin (1994); Green (2001); Miller (2001).
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novel relation governing visual representations aimed to produce reasonable evidence
that representative practices at the turn of the century were strongly informed by
experimental scientific practices and that the shift from figurative to conceptual
representation in art was triggered by a more significant theoretical shift involving
representation as a general philosophical notion.
A historical study of representative practices can provide a novel, practice-
based interpretative framework to reconsider the philosophical problem of
representation. I argue that it is desirable, and indeed possible, to do away with
notions such as similarity or resemblance in favor of a more fundamental concept of
“structural relation”. Specifically, I claim that the conceptual turn that characterized
visual representations in the years 1880-1914 is better understood through the concept
of homomorphism. Homomorphism is a structure-preserving mapping between two
algebraic structures or sets in which elements, properties and relations between
elements are preserved. I developed the concept of homomorphic representations
from Charles S. Peirce’s theory of signs, and specifically from his controversial
formulation of iconic signs.
For over four decades, Peirce’s formulation of iconicity has been the object of
animated philosophical debates. Classical conventionalist and nominalist arguments
regarded iconicity as a weak representative relation based upon similarity or
likeness.39 This is due to some fundamental misunderstandings deriving from Peirce’s
own writings, which reflect the complex philosophical architecture of his semiotic
theory. Peirce claimed that all thinking is by signs40 and all knowledge is
representational activity.41 Hence, any effort toward a classification of signs describes
the organizing principles of our cognitive activity.42
Peirce spent most of his life elaborating typologies of signs that he never
brought to completion.43 For the purposes of this article, I will focus exclusively on a
portion of Peirce’s division of signs, that is, the trichotomy comprising symbols,
indices and icons.44
Symbols are signs that signify by a habit or a convention and exhibit neither a
natural nor a logical connection with the objects they represent. Verbal language is an
example of symbolic system based upon conventional signs. Words in verbal
languages do not exhibit any resemblance with the objects they stand for and they are
associated with certain general meanings by means of a set of rules stipulated by the
speakers of a language.
Indices are signs that stand for their object in an ostensive manner or exhibit a
causal connection with what they represent. Peirce maintained that somehow they
“force”45 us to recognize their causal relationship with the phenomena they stand for.
Lightning before thunder, smoke indicating fire or the connection between a low
barometer and the possibility of rain are examples of indices.46 In these cases, the
relation of signification is not based exclusively upon a convention.




43 See for example CP 8.343 and CP 8.345.
44 The trichotomy symbol-index-icon is relative to the relations between a sign and its Dynamic Object.
The Dynamic Object for Peirce is the object considered as a real external entity, and it is opposed to the
Immediate Object, that is the object as it is represented by the sign (or the object as it is represented in
the process of thinking).
45 Peirce states that indices “direct the attention to their objects by blind compulsion”. See CP 2.306.
46 CP 2.286
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Lastly, Peirce defined icons as signs “partaking in the character of the
object”,47 that is, signs that preserve the relational structure governing their objects. In
several instances, Peirce seemed to stress that the representative relation at the basis
of iconic signs is characterized by a similarity or likeness with the objects they
represent. The definitions below illustrate this point:
“[An] icon…exhibits a similarity or analogy to the subject of discourse”.48
“[An icon is a] sign which stands for something because it resembles it”.49
The similarity that apparently governs iconic signs in Peirce’s account has been at
the core of the misunderstandings that still characterize certain philosophical critiques
of iconicity.50 I suggest that an alternative relation should be considered as the basis
of iconicity. An example from set theory will clarify this point.51 In Euler’s diagrams,
circles are employed to represent sets. Suppose that we want to represent the
expression “Socrates is a mortal”. A strictly symbolic or conventional representation
of this expression is “S  M”, where “S” denotes Socrates, “M” denotes the set of
mortals and “” denotes membership. In Euler’s diagrams this relation is represented
in an immediate, visual fashion, by inscribing S inside a circle which stands for the set
of mortals:
A comparison of Euler’s diagram and the notation “S M” shows that the
diagram represents the relation of membership between an object and a set in a more
natural and immediately observable way. Strictly speaking, however, no physical
resemblance is noticed between the diagram and the states of affairs that it stands for.
Additionally, the signs forming the diagram are conventional: they follow a
stipulation by which S stands for Socrates and the circle stands for the set of mortal
beings. Nevertheless, the way in which the relation of inclusion of an object (in this
case Socrates) in a set (the set of mortals) is expressed through the diagram (S being
inscribed in a circle) is not conventional: the diagram preserves the relations of the
states of affairs that it represents. Such a structural relation allows one to associate the
representation of S inside a circle to the relation of membership or inclusion in a set.
Despite the conventional nature of the representing facts, the relation between the
elements forming the diagrammatic representation of the statement “Socrates is a
mortal” is an instance of semiotic iconicity.
It is not a coincidence that Peirce included diagrams and diagrammatic reasoning
among the most fruitful kinds of iconic signs. The visual directness of diagrams
depends on the iconic component that characterizes them and that is at the basis of
their efficacy in the attainment of novel conclusions.52 Such an iconic component
should not be identified with a superficial similarity of appearance. Peirce explicitly
stressed this aspect of structural relations:
47Peirce, CP 4.531.
48 Peirce, CP 1.369.
49 Peirce, CP 3.362.
50 See Dipert (1996).
51 The example that follows is adapted from Shin (2002), p.26.
52 See Shin (2002), p. 27ff and Pietarinen (2006), p. 113.
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“Many diagrams resemble their objects not at all in looks; it is only in
respect to the relations of their parts that their likeness consists. Thus,





This is an icon. But the only respect in which it resembles its object is
that the brace shows the classes of icons, indices and symbols to be
related to one another and to the general class of signs, as they really
are, in a general way”.53
The representational nature of diagrams is particularly effective for a
clarification of Peirce’s notion of iconicity. Peirce specified that diagrams, as all
iconic signs, rarely function as pure icons:54 symbolic elements intervene in the
representation and background knowledge of such conventions is indispensable to
attain the desired information. In Peirce’s terms:
“A Diagram is a representamen which is predominantly an icon of
relations and is aided to be so by conventions. Indices are also more or
less used. It should be carried out upon a perfectly consistent system of
representation, one founded upon a simple and easily intelligible
idea”.55
Like diagrams, other examples of iconic signs participate in semiotic processes in
a mediated form –that is, in the form of signs that are produced in order to be
interpreted by a mind. Considered in a mediated form, iconic signs include
conventional and indexical elements, which are indispensable for their construction.
The utmost value of icons consists of instantiating a cognitive rule that allows the
mind to establish new relations between previously unconnected representations.
Evidently, Peirce’s formulation of iconicity is not limited to a superficial resemblance
between a sign and the object it stands for. On the contrary, it is a semiotic category
that directly concerns the role of representations in the progress toward novel and
fruitful results. The efficacy of iconic signs consists of the process that they trigger in
the interpreter’s mind. As a result, icons are cognitively treated as real objects rather
than representations.
Peirce explained this feature of iconic signs in one of his most illuminating
passages:
“A diagram, indeed, so far as it has a general signification, is not a
pure Icon; but in the middle part of our reasoning we forget the
53 CP 2.282
54 Peirce clarifies that in most cases a sign displays features that belong simultaneously to the class of
symbols, indices and icons. He stressed that iconic representations partly consist of symbolic
components and considered diagrams as examples of iconicity in mediation. See, for instance, CP
2.276ff.
55 MS 492:1, quoted in Pietarinen (2006), p.111.
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abstractness in great measure, and the diagram is for us the very thing.
So, in contemplating a painting, there is a moment when we lose the
consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and the
copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream –not any
particular existence and yet not general. At that moment we are
contemplating an Icon”.56
In these terms, iconicity is a constitutive feature of thought processes that
culminate in genuine discoveries. If conventional and/or indexical components are
temporarily left aside, iconic representations participate of reasoning processes as if
they were real entities. Peirce maintained that, in this process, the interpreter deals
with “pure dreams”, that is, representations which are neither general nor particular.
Icons enter thought processes in the form of “a composite photograph of images”57 of
the objects they represent. As such, they are to be interpreted as “average images”58 of
real objects, that is, as generalizations deriving from experience. The function of
iconic signs, (which are asserted icons, or icons as they appear in communicative
processes) consists of evoking mental icons (“pure dreams”, in Peirce’s terms). The
fundamental connection between asserted icons and mental icons is at the basis of the
perspicuous and fertile character of certain visual representations.
I claim that the structural relation posed by Peirce at the basis of iconic
representations is more accurately expressed in terms of the mathematical relation of
homomorphism. Homomorphism is a structure-preserving mapping between two
algebraic structures or sets. Contrary to isomorphism, homomorphism is not a one-to-
one (bijective) mapping. A set A (source domain) can be mapped onto a smaller set B
(target domain), so long as their relevant structure is preserved. This requires a
correspondence between properties (symmetry/asymmetry; reflexivity/irreflexivity
etc.) and operations (relations between elements) of both sets. Notice that, in abstract
algebra, homomorphisms do not have to map between sets that have the same
operations (for instance, addition can be mapped onto multiplication). Moreover, the
structural relation between the sets A and B does not necessarily extend to all the
elements of the target domain: part of the elements in the target domain might not be
included in the mapping. In mathematical terms, the target domain thus obtained is
said to be a homomorphic image of the source domain.
It is possible to summarize the conditions for a homomorphic relation to hold
between a representational source and a target domain as follows:
1. Elements of a source domain A represent elements in a target domain
B, with different elements of B represented by different elements of A;
2. f is a mapping or function between A and B such that:
a) If elements in A stand in some relevant relation R, then there is a
relevant relation R´ among elements of B to which they are
assigned by f;
b) If an element in A has a relevant property P, then there is an
element in B with the corresponding property P´.
56 CP 3.362.
57 CP 2.317.
58 I owe this successful expression to Mats Bergman (personal communication). On Peirce’s definition
of icons as “composite photographs” see also Hookway (2007).
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c) If a relation R in A has some structural property
(symmetry/asymmetry, reflexivity/irreflexivity, transitivity etc.),
then the same property holds for R´ in B.59
The concept of homomorphism casts new light on the ambiguous notion of
similarity or likeness that Peirce considered at the basis of iconic representations. A
representational source is an icon of its target if it preserves relevant properties and
relations that hold between the elements of the range of phenomena that it stands for.
A theory of iconicity as homomorphism accounts for structure preservation as a
relation which is established by an act of cognition, and as such has epistemic and
practical consequences.
Conclusions: homomorphism and representative practices, 1880-1914
The conceptual turn that characterized representative practices between 1880 and
1914 revolved around the possibility of reformulating the concept of representation in
terms of structure preservation. Stieglitz’s and Picasso’s works are examples of
homomorphic representations in which elements, properties and relations between
elements are preserved, independently of a faithful, point-to-point similarity with
concrete states of affairs.
Stieglitz’s conceptual approach to photography incorporated the interplay between
experimental skills and theoretical knowledge which was at the basis of Hofmann’s
(and Liebig’s) teaching. Modeled on the chemical practice of proceeding from
experiment to formula, Stieglitz’s photography became a way of capturing structural
relations that are generalizations from visual experience. Similarly, in Picasso’s
Cubist experimentation, representations preserve properties and relations as they are
present in the objects they stand for. Considered as iconic signs, such representations
approach the ways in which objects are mentally conceived – they are, in Peirce’s
terms, “composite photographs of images”.60 Geometry, in particular the novel
concept of space introduced by popularizations of non-Euclidean geometries, allowed
Picasso to represent objects in space as abstractions from experience, in which
fundamental elements, properties and relations were preserved.
From a purely formal viewpoint, Stieglitz’s and Picasso’s works are asserted icons
–that is, representations that stand for certain states of affairs by virtue of a structural,
homomorphic relation. Iconic representations such as The Steerage or Les
Demoiselles d’Avignon are by their own nature cognitively fertile, as they evoke in a
direct and immediate manner mental icons, or what Peirce called “pure dreams”61 –
mental representations that are neither particular nor general and that ultimately
amount to generalizations from experience.
The study of the shift from similarity to homomorphism that characterized
representative practices at the turn of the 20th century opens novel interdisciplinary
paths of inquiry into the nature of representations in general. A philosophical study of
representation needs to incorporate processes and practices that are constitutive
components of specific representative modes of production. With this aim in mind, in
this paper I have proposed a practice-based evaluation of the means and strategies that
compelled artists to turn to science in their quest for a representative relation that
dispenses with similarity. As a result, I hope to have presented a reasonable case for




adopting a novel approach to the study of representations, which I shall characterize
as a “philosophical history of representative practices”. This involves shifting the
emphasis from a quest for the necessary and sufficient conditions for representation –
which are in themselves rather uninformative – to a historically grounded and
interdisciplinary understanding of representations considered as ways of exploring
natural phenomena and intervening upon them.
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